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ENvIRONmENTAL LAW
 CLEAN AIR ACT. Idaho had established an EPA-approved 
State Implementation Plan (SIP) for air quality standards in 
1972 with amendments in 1982, 1993, and 2003. Under the 
SIP	open	burning	was	prohibited	except	for	specifically	named	
burning activities. Field burning of crop residue was not one of 
the named exceptions. In 2005 the EPA approved amendments 
to	the	Idaho	SIP	to	allow	open	burning	of	field	residue	and	the	
plaintiffs objected to the 2005 amendment. The EPA argued that 
the 2005 amendments were merely a restatement of the original 
intent	of	the	SIP	to	allow	open	field	burning.	The	court	held	that	
the	SIP	was	clear	and	specific	as	 to	 the	 limited	exceptions	 to	
open	burning	allowed	under	the	SIP	and	field	burning	of	crop	
residue was not covered under any of the listed exceptions.  Safe 
Air for Everyone v. U.S.E.P.A., 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 12361 
(9th Cir. 2007).
 CLEAN WATER ACT. The defendant owned and operated 
a	 confined	 animal	 feeding	 operation	 (CAFO)	 for	 cattle.	The	
defendant obtained national discharge elimination system permits 
for animal waste disposal through a center pivot irrigation system. 
The	plaintiff	was	a	neighbor	and	filed	an	action	under	the	Clean	
Water Act alleging that the defendant was violating the terms of 
the permits by improperly storing and disposing of the animal 
wastes such that the wastes polluted a pond on the plaintiff’s 
land	and	a	stream.		The	defendant	filed	for	summary	judgment,	
arguing that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the suit for 
lack of injury. The court held that the plaintiff’s ownership of 
the	pond	was	sufficient	to	give	the	plaintiff	standing	to	bring	the	
suit under the private right of action allowed by the Clean Water 
Act.  Kersenbrock v. Stoneman Cattle Co., LLC, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 55401 (D. Kan. 2007).
FEDERAL  AGRICULTURAL 
PROGRAmS
 CROP INSURANCE. The FCIC has adopted as final 
regulations amending the Common Crop Insurance Regulations, 
Millet Crop Insurance Provisions to remove the reduction in 
indemnity for any unharvested millet acreage to better meet 
the needs of insured producers. The changes will apply for the 
2008 and succeeding crop years. 72 Fed. Reg. 48227 (Aug. 23, 
2007).
 EmERGENCY CONSERvATION PROGRAm. The FSA 
has	 adopted	 as	 final	 regulations	 applying	 the	 adjusted	 gross	
income (AGI) limitation to $16 million appropriated to the 
emergency conservation program (ECP). The AGI limitation 
is provided in 7 C.F.R. §§ 1400.600 to 1400.603. In general, 
under  Section 1400.600, an individual or entity is not eligible 
for	 certain	 program	benefits	 during	 a	 crop,	 program,	 or	fiscal	
year, if (1) the preceding three-year average of the AGI for the 
individual or entity exceeds $2.5 million and (2) less than 75 
percent of the average AGI is derived from farming, ranching, or 
forestry	operations.	Section	1400.601	specifies	the	determination	
of	 average	 adjusted	 gross	 income.	Section	 1400.602	 specifies	
the information applicants must provide to comply with the 
regulations.	Section	1400.603	specifies	the	amount	payment	will	
be reduced commensurate with the AGI limitation.  72 Fed. Reg. 
45879 (Aug. 16, 2007).
 PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS ACT.  The plaintiffs were 
chicken growers who contracted with the defendant to raise 
chickens supplied by the defendant. The defendant had a virtual 
monopoly on chicken processing in the area and entered into 
single	flock	contracts	which	extended	only	to	the	delivery,	raising	
and	repurchase	of	one	flock	of	chickens	at	a	time.		The	defendant	
had complete control over the number of chickens involved, 
the delivery times, calculation of the purchase price and most 
other	terms	of	the	contracts.	The	plaintiffs	filed	suit	charging	the	
defendant with unfair practices under the Packers and Stockyards 
Act. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant 
based on the failure of the plaintiffs to provide any evidence that 
the conduct of the defendant injured competition. The appellate 
court held that an holding of unfair practice had to be supported by 
a	finding	that	the	practice	was	an	injury	to	competition.	However,	
the court noted that the allegations made by the plaintiffs, if proven, 
would	 support	 a	 finding	 that	 the	 defendant	 had	 a	monopsony	
(where there existed only one buyer for a particular commodity) 
which would be an injury to competition. Therefore, the court held 
that summary judgment for the defendant was improper. Been v. 
O.K. Industries, Inc., 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 18189 (10th Cir. 
2007).
 WETLANDS. The plaintiff used a bulldozer and brush cutting 
equipment	to	clear	woody	vegetation	and	other	plants	from	five	
acres of land in order to grow row crops on the land. The county 
FSA	office	had	the	land	inspected	by	the	NRCS	which	determined	
that the land was wetlands and the plaintiff had improperly 
converted the wetlands to crop use. The plaintiff argued that the 
removal	of	plants	did	not	meet	the	definition	of	converted	wetlands	
because	the	removal	did	not	impair	or	reduce	the	flow,	circulation	
or	reach	of	water	to	the	land.	The	plaintiff	pointed	to	the	definition	
of converted wetland in the statute, 16 U.S.C. § 3801(a)(6)(A), 
as “. . . wetland	that	has	been	drained,	dredged,	filled,	leveled,	
or otherwise manipulated (including any activity that results in 
impairing	or	 reducing	 the	flow,	 circulation,	 or	 reach	of	water)	
for the purpose or to have the effect of making the production of 
an agricultural commodity possible . . .” The USDA regulations 
define	converted	wetland	as	“wetland  [*14] that has been drained, 
dredged,	 filled,	 leveled,	 or	 otherwise	manipulated	 (including	
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the removal of woody vegetation or any activity that results in 
impairing	or	reducing	the	flow	and	circulation	of	water)	for	the	
purpose of or to have the effect of making possible the production 
of an agricultural commodity without further application of 
the manipulations described herein . . .” (emphasis added). 
The plaintiff argued that the added language was an improper 
expansion	of	the	statutory	definition.	The	court	held	that	the	USDA	
regulation was a proper interpretation of the statute because the 
parenthetical language in the statute was merely an illustrative 
example of prohibited manipulation and not a restriction on the 
definition.	The	court	also	noted	that	the	purpose	of	the	statute	was	
to prohibit actions which allowed wetlands to be used for crop 
production. Because the removal of the plants allowed the plaintiff 
to produce row crops on the wetland area, the actions amounted 
to a conversion of the wetlands.  Ballanger v. Johanns, 2007 
U.S. App. LEXIS 18245 (8th Cir. 2007), aff’g, 451 F. Supp.2d 
1061 (S.D. Iowa 2006).
 FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAXATION
 LEGAL EXPENSES. The decedent left two wills with different 
named	executors	and	beneficiaries.	Both	executors	filed	their	wills	
for	probate	and	the	executor	of	the	will	first	in	time	challenged	
the decedent’s testamentary capacity at the time the second will 
was executed. The probate court ruled that the decedent lacked 
testamentary capacity when the second will was executed; 
therefore,	 the	second	will	was	invalid.	The	beneficiaries	under	
the two wills reached a settlement and the estate was closed. The 
estate claimed a deduction for the attorney fees incurred in the 
will dispute. The court noted that California law allowed only for 
estate payment of the legal fees of personal representatives but 
California law was not raised by either party so the court allowed 
the	 deduction	 as	 to	 the	 personal	 representative	who	filed	 the	
invalid will. The court held that the deduction was limited to the 
legal fees incurred by the two executors but could not include the 
legal	fees	incurred	by	any	beneficiary.		Kessler v. United States, 
2007-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,544 (N.D. Calif. 2007). 
 vALUATION. The decedent’s estate included 19 paintings 
in which the decedent owned a 50 percent interest. The estate 
claimed a fractional interest discount of 44 percent, arguing that 
a hypothetical buyer would attempt to sell the fractional interest 
instead of forcing a partition with distribution of the proceeds. 
The court noted that a hypothetical buyer would have the right 
of partition and sale; therefore, the value of the fractional interest 
would	be	discounted	only	for	the	costs	of	the	partition	less	five	
percent for the risk involved in waiting for a partition action to be 
resolved.  Stone v. United States, 2007-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 
¶ 60,545 (N.D. Calif. 2007).
 FEDERAL INCOmE 
TAXATION
 ALTERNATIvE mINImUm TAX. The taxpayer received 
incentive stock options from an employer and exercised the 
stock options for a small percentage of the value of the stock 
received. In the tax year of the exercise, the taxpayer claimed 
the difference between the cost of the stock and the fair market 
value on the date of the ISO exercise as alternative minimum 
tax income.  This created two bases in the stock, the regular tax 
basis of the cost of exercising the ISO and the AMT basis equal 
to the exercise cost plus the amount included in AMTI. When the 
taxpayer later sold the stock, the sale produced alternative tax net 
operating loss (ATNOL). The taxpayer argued that the difference 
between the adjusted AMT basis and the regular tax basis of the 
sold stock was an adjustment to the ATNOL.  The court held 
that the difference in basis was not allowed as an adjustment to 
ATNOL since such an adjustment was not authorized under the 
AMT statute.  marcus v. Comm’r, 129 T.C. No. 4 (2007).
 ASSET PURCHASE AGREEmENT. The taxpayer owned 
a meat processing, marketing, and distributing corporation. The 
corporation entered into an asset purchase agreement under 
which the taxpayer signed a non-competition agreement in 
exchange for $1 million. The taxpayer claimed the $1 million 
as capital gain from the sale of goodwill. The IRS argued that it 
could reallocate the $1 million under I.R.C. § 1060 to ordinary 
income as received in exchange for the non-competition 
agreement. The court held that I.R.C. § 1060 could only be used 
against the corporation, and could not be used to reallocate the 
income as claimed by the taxpayer, who was not the seller under 
the asset purchase agreement.  muskat v. United States, 2007-2 
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,581 (D. N.H. 2007).
 COmmUNITY PROPERTY INCOmE. The taxpayer was 
legally married but separated from the taxpayer’s spouse in 2000. 
The	taxpayer	filed	under	the	“single”	filing	status	on	the	2000	
tax return, including all of the taxpayer’s wages as income. The 
taxpayer	filed	an	amended	return	which	included	only	one-half	
of the wage income. The taxpayer argued that, because the 
couple lived in a community property state, Texas, one-half of 
the wages was income to the spouse. The IRS responded that 
it was entitled to use community property, in the form of taxes 
withheld from the taxpayer’s wages to satisfy a community 
property debt, in the form of the taxes due. The court agreed 
and held that the taxpayer was not entitled to a refund of taxes 
paid on one-half of the wages received in 2000. Cooper v. 
United States, 2007-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,576 (N.D. 
Tex. 2007).
 COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEmENTS. The taxpayer 
filed	a	suit	for	wrongful	discharge	against	a	former	employer.	
The taxpayer received a settlement lump sum payment; however 
the payment was used to pay state and federal employment 
withholding taxes and attorneys’ fees. The taxpayer argued that 
the settlement payment was either (1) not included in income 
because	the	taxpayer	did	not	receive	any	benefit	of	the	settlement	
or (2) should be taxed over the eight years that were used to 
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calculate the back wages paid as part of the settlement. The court 
held that the settlement payment was taxable when received and 
was all included in the taxpayer’s income because the taxpayer 
failed to show that the attorney had any property interest in the 
settlement.	The	appellate	court	affirmed	in	a	decision	designated	
as not for publication.  messina v. Comm’r, 2007-2 U.S. Tax 
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,598 (4th Cir. 2007), aff’g on point, T.C. 
memo. 2006-107.
 The taxpayer participated in a class action suit alleging age 
discrimination and other related causes against a county and a 
housing association which attempted to enforce age restriction 
zoning requirements on the taxpayer’s residence. The original 
petition in the case alleged physical injury from emotional 
distress but no other injuries. The taxpayer excluded a portion 
of the settlement proceeds from income as money received for 
personal injuries. The taxpayer did not provide any evidence 
of any physical injury. The court held that the entire settlement 
proceeds were included in taxable income because the taxpayer 
failed to demonstrate that any of the proceeds were paid for 
physical injuries.  Gibson v. Comm’r, T.C. memo. 2007-
224.
 DEPENDENTS. The taxpayer was divorced under a decree 
that awarded custody of the taxpayer’s two children to the 
former spouse and required the taxpayer to pay 75 percent of 
the child support. The children lived with the former spouse 
more than one-half of the year and the former spouse did not 
execute Form 8332, Release of Claim to Exemption for Child of 
Divorced or Separated Parents. The taxpayer argued that I.R.C. 
§ 152(e) denied noncustodial parents equal protection under the 
14th Amendment to the Constitution by granting the dependency 
exemption to a custodial parent by default, regardless of the 
percentage of support furnished by each parent. The court held 
that the statutory scheme was rationally based on the need to 
reduce the burden on the IRS for determining which parent was 
to receive the exemption; therefore, the presumption in favor 
of the custodial spouse was proper and constitutional.  Harris 
v. Comm’r, T.C. memo. 2007-239.
 DISASTER LOSSES. On July 31, 2007, the president 
determined that certain areas in the Federated States of 
Micronesia are eligible for assistance from the government 
under the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 
U.S.C. § 5121) as a result of a drought, which began on March 
5, 2007. FEmA-3276-Em.  On August 8, 2007, the president 
determined that certain areas in Maine are eligible for assistance 
from the government under the Act as a result of severe storms 
and	flooding,	which	began	on	July	11,	2007. FEmA-1716-DR. 
Taxpayers who sustained losses attributable to these disasters 
may deduct the losses on their 2006 returns.
 EmPLOYEES.	The	taxpayer	owned	and	operated	a	muffler	
repair shop and had treated the shop’s workers as employees for 
purposes of income tax withholding for several years. In 2000 
the	taxpayer	stopped	this	practice	and	filed	for	refunds	of	past	
employee taxes, arguing that the workers were independent 
contractors. The taxpayer failed to respond to an IRS request for 
admission and the court ruled that the taxpayer had admitted to 
all the points  included in the request. The court discussed the 
seven factors used by courts in determining whether an employee 
relationship existed: (1) the degree of control exercised by the 
principal; (2) which party invests in the work facilities used by 
the	individual;	(3)	the	opportunity	of	the	individual	for	profit	or	
loss; (4) whether the principal can discharge the individual; (5) 
whether the work is part of the principal’s regular business; (6) 
the permanency of the relationship; and (7) the relationship the 
parties believed they were creating. The court held that the deemed 
admissions demonstrated that the shop workers were employees 
and the taxpayer was subject to employee tax withholding and 
payment.  Colorado Mufflers Unlimited, Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C. 
memo. 2007-222.
 FOREIGN INCOmE. The taxpayer performed work in 
Antarctica and the taxpayer excluded the wages earned while in 
Antarctica under I.R.C. § 911 as foreign income.  The court held 
that income earned in Antarctica was not excludible under I.R.C. § 
911 because Antarctica was not recognized by the U.S.  government 
as a foreign sovereign nation. Rue v. Comm’r, T.C. memo. 2007-
228; Dunne v. Comm’r, T.C. memo. 2007-229; Dominguez v. 
Comm’r, T.C. memo. 2007-230; Garner v. Comm’r, T.C. memo. 
2007-231; Snyder v. Comm’r, T.C. memo. 2007-232.
 HYBRID vEHICLE TAX CREDIT.  The IRS has announced 
that Nissan North America, Inc. has not yet sold 60,000 hybrid 
vehicles	and	the	hybrid	vehicle	certifications	and	the	credit	amounts	
are still available for:
 Year and Model Credit Amount
 2007 Altima Hybrid $2,350
See Harl, “Additional Items in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 16 
Agric. L. Dig. 131 (2005). IR-2007-147.
 INNOCENT SPOUSE. The	taxpayer	filed	a	joint	return	with	
a spouse who claimed a charitable deduction. The taxpayer had 
reviewed the tax return and noted that a charitable deduction was 
claimed, although no charitable contribution was made in that 
year. The taxpayer signed the joint return. The court held that the 
taxpayer was not eligible for innocent spouse relief for liability for 
the taxes owed for the disallowed charitable deduction because the 
taxpayer was aware that the taxpayers had not made the charitable 
contribution. Schwendeman v. Comm’r, T.C. memo. 2007-
227.
 The taxpayer’s spouse had embezzled funds from the spouse’s 
employer during a tax year without the knowledge of the taxpayer. 
The	taxpayer	learned	about	the	embezzlement	after	the	filing	of	
the	 income	 tax	 return	 for	 that	 tax	year	 and	 the	 couple	filed	 an	
amended return which declared the embezzled amount in income. 
The taxpayer sought innocent spouse relief from the tax liability 
created by the inclusion of the embezzled funds in taxable income. 
The IRS denied the relief, arguing that the taxpayer knew about the 
embezzled	funds	when	the	amended	return	was	filed.	The	court	held	
that the IRS denial of relief was arbitrary and an abuse of discretion 
under the factors set forth in Rev. Rul. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447 
because the taxpayer did not know about the embezzlement when 
the	original	return	was	filed	and	the	taxpayer	did	not	benefit	from	
the embezzled funds or the failure to pay the taxes on the embezzled 
funds.  Billings v. Comm’r, T.C. memo. 2007-234.
 INSTALLmENT REPORTING. The taxpayer, a limited 
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liability company taxed as a partnership, purchased loans from 
a bankruptcy estate and resold the loans to an unrelated party 
for cash plus additional amounts. Because the taxpayer did not 
know the amount of the additional payments or when the amounts 
would be paid, the taxpayer intended to elect out of reporting 
the gain on the installment method.  However, the taxpayer’s tax 
officer	failed	to	make	the	election	on	the	taxpayer’s	tax	return.	
The IRS granted an extension of time to make the election.  Ltr. 
Rul. 200733003, may 18, 2007.
 mEDICAL EXPENSES.  The taxpayers, husband and wife, 
entered into a residency agreement with a lifetime care facility 
and paid an entrance fee to begin the agreement. The care facility 
initially	notified	the	taxpayers	that	18.9	percent	of	the	entrance	
fee was attributable to medical care provided by the facility but 
later changed its calculation method to report that 41 percent 
of the entrance fee was attributable to the medical costs. The 
taxpayers based their claimed medical deductions based on this 
percentage.	The	IRS	filed	for	summary	judgment,	arguing	that	
none of the entrance fee was deductible as medical costs. The 
court held that some portion of the entrance fee was allocable to 
medical costs to be provided by the facility so summary judgment 
was improper. The factual issue of the proper amount was not 
decided. Finzer v. United States, 2007-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 
¶ 50,591 (N.D. Ill. 2007). However, in a subsequent hearing, 
the court found that the entrance fee was based solely on the 
quality of the housing unit selected by the taxpayers and had no 
relationship to the medical services provided. The court noted that 
all housing units received the same level of medical care and that 
the entrance fee was refundable based on the length of time the 
unit was used by the taxpayers. Therefore, the entrance fee was a 
loan to the facility which was paid by the facility through the use 
of the housing unit. The court held that no portion of the entrance 
fee was deductible as medical costs. Finzer v. United States, 
2007-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,592 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
 PARTNERSHIPS
 REORGANIZATION. The IRS has issued proposed regulations 
that address the allocation of pre-contribution gain or loss to a 
partner of a partnership that engages in an assets-over merger with 
another partnership. The regulations implement the principles 
previously articulated in Rev. Rul. 2004-43, 2004-1 C.B. 842, 
and will generally be effective for any distributions of property 
after January 19, 2005, if such property was contributed in an 
assets-over merger after May 3, 2004. 72 Fed. 46932 (Aug. 22, 
2007).
 PASSIvE ACTIvITY LOSSES. The taxpayer was a trust 
which acquired an interest in a limited liability company which 
was	classified	as	a	partnership	for	federal	tax	purposes.	The	trust	
provided management services for the partnership by hiring 
special trustees to provide the services. The special trustees had 
no authority over trust property or trust affairs. The trust sought 
a ruling that the participation of the special trustees would 
count as material participation of the trust in the business of the 
partnership for purposes of the passive activity losses rules. The 
IRS ruled that only the participation of trustees as part of their 
fiduciary	duties	would	could	towards	the	material	participation	
of the trust. Because the special trustees had no discretionary 
fiduciary	 responsibility	 toward	 the	 trust,	 their	 participation	 in	
the partnership business did not count as material participation. 
The IRS noted a contrary holding in Mattie K. Carter Trust v. 
United States, 256 F.Supp.2d 536 (N.D. Tex. 2003), but rejected 
that holding as inconsistent with the rule that the activities 
of employees of a business owner do not count as material 
participation by the owner. T.A.m. 200732023, Aug. 17, 2007.
 REFUNDS. The taxpayer corporation had a net operating loss 
in 1994, a portion of which was disallowed under the rules in 
existence in 1994. The rules were later held to be invalid and the 
taxpayer attempted to make use of the disallowed net operating 
losses	by	first	carrying	the	losses	back	to	earlier	years,	but	the	only	
year with capital gains was 1993. The remaining net operating 
losses were carried forward to 1995 and an amended return was 
filed,	claiming	a	refund.	The	IRS	disallowed	the	refund,	arguing	
that the refund claim was untimely since more than three years 
had	passed	since	the	filing	of	the	return	for	1995.	The	taxpayer	
argued that I.R.C. § 6511(d)(2)(A) allowed an exception to the 
three-year rule because the refund resulted from a net operating 
loss carryback. The court held that the refund claim was not 
entitled to the exception because the refund claim resulted from 
a net operating loss carryforward of the net operating losses 
incurred in 1994.  Electrolux Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 
2007-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,583 (Fed. Cir. 2007), aff’g, 
71 Fed. Cl. 748 (2006).
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
September 2007
 Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR  4.82 4.76 4.73 4.71
110 percent AFR 5.31 5.24 5.21 5.18
120 percent AFR 5.79 5.71 5.67 5.64
mid-term
AFR  4.79 4.73 4.70 4.68
110 percent AFR  5.27 5.20 5.17 5.14
120 percent AFR 5.76 5.68 5.64 5.61
Long-term
AFR 5.09 5.03 5.00 4.98
110 percent AFR  5.61 5.53 5.49 5.47
120 percent AFR  6.13 6.04 6.00 5.97
Rev. Rul. 2007-57, I.R.B. 2007-36.
 TAX SHELTERS.	The	IRS	has	identified	transactions	similar	
to the following as “transactions of interest for purposes of Treas. 
Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(6).” In a typical transaction, an advisor owns 
all of the membership interests in a limited liability company 
(LLC) that directly or indirectly owns real property (other than 
a	personal	residence	as	defined	in	Treas.	Reg.	§ 1.170A-7(b)(3)) 
that may be subject to a long-term lease. The advisor and a 
taxpayer enter into an agreement under the terms of which the 
advisor continues to own the membership interests in LLC for 
a term of years (the Initial Member Interest), and the taxpayer 
purchases the successor member interest in LLC (the Successor 
Member Interest), which entitles the taxpayer to own all of the 
membership interests in LLC upon the expiration of the term of 
years. In some variations of this transaction, the taxpayer may hold 
the Successor Member Interest through another entity, such as a 
single member limited liability company. Further, the agreement 
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may refer to the Successor Member Interest as a remainder 
interest. After holding the Successor Member Interest for more 
than one year (in order to treat the interest as long-term capital 
gain property), the taxpayer transfers the Successor Member 
Interest to an organization described in I.R.C. § 170(c) (charity). 
The taxpayer claims the value of the Successor Member Interest 
to	be	an	amount	that	is	significantly	higher	than	the	taxpayer’s	
purchase price (for example, an amount that is a multiple of the 
taxpayer’s purchase price and exceeds normal appreciation). 
The taxpayer claims a charitable contribution deduction under 
I.R.C. § 170 based on this higher amount. The taxpayer reaches 
this value by taking into account an appraisal obtained by or on 
behalf of the advisor or the taxpayer of the fee interest in the 
underlying real property and the I.R.C. § 7520 valuation tables. 
Participants in these transactions have reporting requirements 
under I.R.C. §§ 6111, 6112.  Notice 2007-72, I.R.B. 2007-36.
 THEFT LOSS.  The taxpayer was a debtor in bankruptcy and 
had claimed theft loss deductions based on the loss of several 
Persian rugs. The taxpayer provided only oral testimony and 
a “cost appraisal” of the lost rugs. The Bankruptcy Court had 
denied the deduction for lack of substantiation of the taxpayer’s 
tax	basis	in	the	rugs	and	the	District	Court	affirmed.	On	further	
appeal, the District Court’s decision was vacated because the 
Bankruptcy Court had approved the refund of taxes requested 
by the taxpayer’s bankruptcy estate; therefore, the District Court 
lacked jurisdiction to rule on issues which did not affect the relief 
requested by the taxpayer.  Smith v. IRS, 2007-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) ¶ 50,599 (9th Cir. 2007), vac’g and aff’g, 2007-1 U.S. 
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,277 (D. Nev. 2006).
 WITHHOLDING TAXES.	The	 taxpayers	were	nonprofit	
corporations which offered graduate medical education programs 
for medical residents and fellows. The residents were enrolled in 
courses, performed research and participated in teaching rounds, 
receiving	grades,	evaluations	and	certification	at	the	end	of	the	
program.  The residents received stipends to help offset the cost 
of enrollment and the taxpayers did not withhold or pay FICA 
taxes on the stipends, arguing that the stipends were exempt 
under I.R.C. § 3121(b)(10) as amounts paid to students. The 
IRS issued regulations which restricted the Section 3121(b)(10) 
exemption to organizations with a primary purpose of education. 
The court held that the regulations were invalid as improperly 
restricting the exemption beyond the statute.  mayo Foundation 
for medical Education and Research v. United States, 2007-2 
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,577 (D. minn. 2007).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
 SUPPLIER’S LIEN. The debtor obtained loans from a bank 
and granted security interests in all farm property, including 
crops growing and to be grown on the farm. The bank perfected 
the security interests. The defendant supplied beet seeds to the 
debtor which were used to raise a crop of beets. The defendant 
claimed a priority agricultural supplier’s lien on the crop. The 
bank argued that the defendant’s lien was not perfected because 
the defendant did not provide the debtor with a billing statement, 
as required by N.D. Cent. Code § 35-31-02, that included a notice 
that if the amount due to the defendant was not paid, a lien could 
be	filed	against	the	crop.	The	court	found	that	no	such	billing	
statement was provided to the debtor; however, the court held 
that the supplier’s lien was perfected because the defendant had 
substantially complied with the lien requirements since the debtor 
had	actual	knowledge	that	the	supplier’s	lien	could	be	filed	if	no	
payment was made.  Stockman Bank of montana v. AGSCO, 
Inc., 727 N.W.2d 742 (N.D. 2007).
WATER RIGHTS
 DITCH RIGHTS. The plaintiff’s ranch was originally part of 
a single family ranch which was split to provide separate ranches 
for three sons. When the ranch was split, each parcel received a 
portion of the total water rights and portion of the ditch rights such 
that	each	parcel	could	be	flood	irrigated.	The	defendant	purchased	
one of the parcels with the ditches but some of the ditches did 
not	extend	beyond	the	defendant’s	parcel.	The	defendant	filled	in	
these ditches because they were not used to convey water for any 
irrigation,	and	the	plaintiff	filed	suit,	claiming	that	the	plaintiff’s	
interest in these ditches prevented the blocking of the plaintiff’s 
ditch right. The court held that the deed conveying the original 
ranch to the three sons was ambiguous as to the extent of the ditch 
rights conveyed to each parcel as to the ditches contained on the 
defendant’s	parcel.	The	evidence	showed	that	the	filled-in	ditches	
were not used for conveying water for the irrigation systems but 
only assisted the irrigation by increasing the moisture in the land 
around the other ditches which did convey the irrigation water. 
The court held that the deed dividing the original ranch did not 
convey a ditch right in these supporting ditches because these 
ditches did not convey any irrigation water. The court noted that 
the supporting ditches had not been used for many years as part 
of the irrigation efforts. Wills Cattle Co. v. Shaw, 2007 mont. 
LEXIS 368 (mont. 2007). 
 OWNERSHIP. The plaintiff sought to modify the water rights 
of	seven	water	rights	certificates	by	consolidating	seven	points	
of diversion to two points of diversion. The plaintiff’s land was 
appurtenant to the water rights to be used but two of the water 
rights	certificates	were	owned	by	the	irrigation	district,	with	the	
other	five	owned	by	the	plaintiff.	The	irrigation	district	objected	
to the consolidation but the water resources commission allowed 
the consolidation because the water used came from a river 
appurtenant to the plaintiff’s land. The court reversed, holding 
that	the	water	rights	certificates	established	the	ownership	of	the	
water rights in the irrigation district and the consolidation could 
not	include	the	two	certificates	without	the	application	by	the	
irrigation district.  Fort vannoy Irrigation District v. Water 
Resources Comm’n, 2007 Ore. App. LEXIS 974 (Or. Ct. App. 
2007).
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The Seminars in Paradise have returned!
FARm INCOmE TAX,
ESTATE AND BUSINESS PLANNING SEmINARS
by Neil E. Harl
Outrigger Keauhou Beach Resort, Big Island, Hawai’i.  January 8-12, 2008
 Spend a week in Hawai’i in January 2008! Balmy trade winds, 70-80 degrees, palm trees, white sand beaches 
and the rest of paradise can be yours; plus a world-class seminar on Farm Income Tax, Estate and Business 
Planning by Dr. Neil E. Harl.  The seminar is scheduled for January 8-12, 2008 at the spectacular ocean-front 
Outrigger Keauhou Beach Resort on Keauhou Bay, 12 miles south of the Kona International Airport on the Big 
Island, Hawai’i.
 Seminar sessions run from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. each day, Tuesday through Saturday, with a continental 
breakfast and break refreshments included in the registration fee. Each participant will receive a copy of Dr. Harl’s 
400+ page seminar manual Farm Income Tax: Annotated Materials and the 600+ page seminar manual, Farm 
Estate and Business Planning: Annotated Materials, both of which will be updated just prior to the seminar.
 Here are a sample of the major topics to be covered:
 • Farm income items and deductions; losses; like-kind exchanges; and taxation of debt including the new 
Chapter 12 bankruptcy tax.
 • Income tax aspects of property transfer, including income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private 
annuities, self-canceling installment notes, and part gift/part sale transactions.
 • Introduction to estate and business planning.
 • Co-ownership of property, including discounts, taxation and special problems.
 • Federal estate tax, including alternate valuation date, special use valuation, handling life insurance, marital 
deduction planning, disclaimers, planning to minimize tax over deaths of both spouses, and generation skipping 
transfer tax.
 • Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future interests, handling estate freezes, and “hidden” 
gifts.
 • Organizing the farm business—one entity or two, corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited 
liability companies.
 The Agricultural Law Press has made arrangements for substantial discounts on partial ocean view hotel 
rooms at the Outrigger Keauhou Beach Resort, the site of the seminar. 
 The seminar registration fee is $645 for current subscribers to the Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural 
Law Manual or the Principles of Agricultural Law. The registration fee for nonsubscribers is $695.   For more 
information call Robert Achenbach at 541-302-1958 or e-mail at robert@agrilawpress.com.
